Time overruns are common in public works and are not con…ned to inherently complex tasks. One explanation advanced in this paper is that bidders can undergo unpredictable changes in production costs which generate an option value of waiting. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time in ‡uences their bidding behaviour, and how this can ultimately a¤ect the parties' expected payo¤s. Further, we examine the outcome of the bidding process when legal rules prevent the promisee from contracting for damage measures which would grant more than her lost expectation. We show that when the pre-agreed compensatory payments prove insu¢ cient to discourage delayed orders, setting a liquidated damages clause would not lead to a Pareto superior outcome with respect to the no-damage-for delay condition. While such a clause would increase the seller's expected payo¤, the buyer's expected payo¤ is lower than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery.
Knowing this, buyers usually include in their contracts damage measures which specify in advance the amount of compensation for late completion, in the hopes that they will preclude the need for litigation and will stimulate the seller to meet her obligations. Even these contractual remedies, however, may prove insu¢ cient to discourage project delays.
Indeed, the empirical literature on public procurement suggests that, despite such provisions are routinely included in contract documents, delays are common and are not con…ned to inherently complex tasks, such as large infrastructure or military projects, where time overruns are often associated with important changes in the initial design (Ganuza, 2007) . For example, using a sample including 894 projects, belonging to seventeen infrastructure sectors, completed in India during 1992-2009, Singh (2009) The ine¢ cacy of so called "penalty" clauses in stimulating compliance with contractual obligations might be generated by several circumstances.
Firstly, these provisions rest on the assumption of a well-functioning system of enforcement, namely on the courts'ability to resolve disputes cheaply and predictably. In the real world, however, parties must often a¤ord substantial enforcement costs, which can pathologically increase because of the poor quality (e.g. the time-ine¢ ciency) of the judicial system. As pointed out by Guash et al. (2006) , the lower the quality of the system, the lower the probability of contract enforcement.
Secondly, buyers can …nd it technically di¢ cult to predetermine a damage measure such that the sellers would always decide to meet their obligations. Since the potential suppliers may have di¤erent, privately known, opportunity costs of compliance with delivery schedules, the common practice in public procurements to set, at the pre-selection stage, …xed late-delivery penalties can turn out to be insu¢ cient to discourage project delays. Moreover, in some countries, public procurement regulations cap the level of the enforceable amount of compensation for late completion. In Italy, for example, the value of penalties cannot exceed 10 per cent of the contract value (Albano et al., 2006) .
Finally, even if buyers were able to set a level of compensation such that it would be potentially convenient for the contractor to comply with the contract time, in case of a dispute the stipulated compensation could not be enforced, because the court might judge it inconsistent with legal standards.
Even if in the economic literature on procurement the term "penalty" is often indistinctly used to describe contractual provisions which are intended to protect the owner from the harm she could su¤er from breach, and clauses used for the purpose of pressuring the contractor into performance, the distinction may have relevant legal implications, particularly in Common Law jurisdictions where courts will generally refuse to award compensation if it amounts to a penalty, i.e. if it is found that it was intended to be a punishment or a deterrent against the breach of a contract. Only liquidated damages are enforceable, as long as they appear to be a reasonable estimate of potential damages that are di¢ cult (costly) to prove once incurred.
The common law of liquidated damages has generated an extensive body of legal literature. Though the voidance of penalty clauses has been traditionally justi…ed on public policy and fairness grounds (Di Matteo, 2001 ), various authors have also argued that it is indeed an e¢ cient rule of the common law of contract. According to the so called "e¢ cient breach theory", by in ‡ating the price of breach, the enforcement of punitive damages would estinguish the economic incentive to pursue an otherwise more pro…table venture, by so doing preventing the net social gain that would result from nonperformance (Goetz and Scott, 1977) . Shavell (1980) formally proved that limiting a promisee's recovery to her lost expectation is generally e¢ cient respecting breach, because it induces the parties to perform when performance would maximize their joint gains. Rea (1984) inferred from this result that the parties are unlikely to agree to damage measures that exceed the expected loss. Schwartz (1990) extended Rea's inference by arguing that such measures could prove undesirable for the promisees themselves, because they would have to pay for supracompensatory remedies.
In Civil Code countries the attitude is quite di¤erent, since the Napoleonic Code, upon which most civil codes are based, allowed for penalties to stimulate performance. However, in recent years, there has been a tendency toward making a more clear-cut distinction between clauses whose main purpose is to induce the promisor to ful…ll her obligations and a genuine pre-assessment of damages, and narrowing the scope of penalties (McKenna, 2008) . In so doing, some civil codes seem to have followed the precedent of the Council of Europe's Resolution on Penalty Clauses. 3 According to the Resolution, penal clauses are not invalid per se, but courts are allowed to reduce the amount of the penalty if they …nd it "manifestly excessive".
Thus, depending on the context at hand, the costs incurred in going to courts, the lack of information about the sellers'opportunity cost of compliance, regulations capping the enforceable amount of compensation for late-delivery, or legal rules which prevent the promisee from contracting for damage measures which would grant more than her lost expectation, can ultimately undermine the e¤ectiveness of these contractual provisions. When alternative remedies, such as the threat of disquali…cation for future tenders, are not available, this can involve the emergency of (a degree of) unenforceability of the contract time.
The scope of this paper is to analyse the consequences arising from such unenforceability. Specifically, we ask two questions. First, who gains and who loses when, for whatever reasons, the buyer is unable to induce a timely performance? And, second, how the parties'terms of trade will be a¤ected by a contractual damage measure which is intended to protect the owner from the harm she could reasonably expect to su¤er from late completion?
We address these questions by focussing on the case where a "simple project" 4 is procured by competitive tendering, bidders have private information about some components of the project cost, and the latter cannot be fully predicted because of on-going changes in market conditions, which, without altering the essential nature of the performance, can non-negligibly a¤ect the actual production cost. Therefore, our analysis will be restricted to situations where the uncertainties involved in contract performance are neither of a nature which does not permit to use a …xed-price contract, nor of a nature which could warrant excusing performance (Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite, 2007) . 5 The proposed framework integrates two bodies of economic literature. The …rst is that on the real-option approach, which has been applied in several areas, but has not been extensively used to address procurement topics. The available works mostly focus on the evaluation, from a contractor's perspective, of a project embedding some elements of managerial ‡exibility (see, for example, Ford et al., 2002; Ho and Liu, 2002; Garvin and Cheah, 2004) , without addressing the e¤ects of ‡exibility on agents' bidding behaviour. One of the few exceptions is the paper by You and Tam (2006) who, however, do not employ a game-theoretic framework to analyse how managerial discretion in ‡uences 3 Resolution 78(3) adopted by the Committee of Ministers on January 20, 1978. 4 Following Bajari and Tadelis (2006), the term "simple" is used here to denote a project which is "easy to design with little uncertainty about what needs to be produced" (p.124). 5 For example, in the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller [...] is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made" (UCC § 2-615). Comment 4 to UCC § 2-615 speci…es that "increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market is in itself a justi…cation, for what is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at …xed prices are intended to cover". bidding behaviour in a competitive environment.
The second strand of literature is that analyzing the consequences associated with the absence of contract enforcement. 6 The papers most related to our work are Spulber (1990) and Lewis and Sappington (1991) . The former illustrates how the ability of buyers and sellers to make credible commitments determines their behaviour, and shows that the less-quali…ed …rms, that intend to perform only under the most favorable cost conditions, can force the most quali…ed bidders to bid low, to the point at which they can breach the contract if a cost overrun occurs. Lewis and Sappington (1991) illustrate the impact, upon the parties' terms of trading, arising when the quality of the procured product can be observed perfectly by the buyer and the contractor, but may not be veri…able by a third party, and present a set of conditions under which the equilibrium welfare of both parties is higher when quality is veri…able than when it is unveri…able. However, these, as well most of the studies dealing with the consequences that arise when certain relevant quality dimensions are di¢ cult to enforce, do not focus on our main concern. Although delivery guarantees are often mentioned as one of such relevant dimensions, the theoretical literature has paid relatively limited attention to the speci…c consequences arising from bidders anticipating the unenforceability of the contract time.
Our paper o¤ers two contributions. First, by using the real-option approach, we examine the outcome of the bidding process when the buyer cannot a¤ect the probability of performance through her choice of a contract damage measure. We show that the seller's expected payo¤ is lower when the contract time is unenforceable than when is enforceable, while the buyer's expected payo¤ can be either higher or lower, depending on the relative importance attached to on-time delivery. Second, we contribute to the literature on the law of liquidated damages, by analysing the outcome of the process when the stipulated amount of compensation for late-delivery is intended to protect the owner from the expected costs of time overruns. Our model suggests that, when the pre-agreed compensatory payments fail to discourage delayed orders, setting a liquidated damages clause would not make both parties better o¤. Speci…cally, while such a clause would increase the seller's expected payo¤, the buyer's expected payo¤ is lower than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic assumptions of the model. In Section 3 we analyse the e¤ects of unenforceability of contract time on the parties'expected payo¤s. Section 4 is devoted to the e¤ects of awarding a contract containing liquidated damages provisions. Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
The model
Consider a buyer who wants to procure a simple and indivisible project (good or service) whose speci…cations can be easily monitored and veri…ed by any third party.
By assuming that there is no uncertainty about what needs to be produced, and that the project's quality standards, as speci…ed in contract documents, can be easily veri…ed, we abstract away from situations where time overruns are related to incomplete project design as well as from situations where performance standards, other than the completion time, are unveri…able. 6 The literature addressing the problems arising when some unveri…able quality dimensions are present in economic exchange, can be broadly divided into two groups. First, there is a large literature looking at the mechanisms by which the outcome of the procurement process could be improved, namely by taking factors other than price into account in the award process. The literature on scoring auctions starting with Che (1993) …ts within this group. Second, we have a literature describing the consequences arising from the absence of contract enforcement, by taking as …xed the institutional framework (e.g. procurement regulations forcing public sector beaurocrats to award …xed-price contracts by competitive tendering), or particular award rules used in practice (e.g. price-only auctions). Our paper …ts into the second group.
There are n (n > 1) agents capable of performing the task, which will be assigned through a sealedbid auction, with the …xed-price contract going to the lowest bidder, who will receive the winning bid (p) on the delivery date ( ). 7 The buyer values the project B, provided that it will be completed within the date established at the contract award. To economize on notation, without loss of generality, we shall set the contract time at zero.
Should the contractor not to comply with the contract time, B would fall by D( ), which re ‡ects the cost of delays to the owner, with D(0) = 0 and D 0 ( ) > 0. 8 A central feature of our model is that it allows for on-going unpredictable exogenous variations in production costs (e.g. changes in the price of materials, equipment rental rates, labour costs) which, without requiring a new project design -i.e., for both parties to adapt-could non-negligibly a¤ect the actual cost of completing all work as speci…ed in the contract documents. Thus, sellers can potentially save on project cost, by adjusting delivery plans on the ground of the information arriving after contract award.
Speci…cally, we make the following assumptions about the production costs.
Assumption 1
Given that agent i is selected, the instantaneous 9 ex-post project cost K i t has two components:
where i re ‡ects the ith agent's innate capabilities, and fC t ; t 0g ; is a random variable representing unpredictable changes that arise in the course of the project.
Assumption 2
The value of is private knowledge. Agent i only knows that j ; j 6 = i is drawn from a common prior cumulative distribution F ( ) with continuously di¤erentiable density f ( ) de…ned on a positive support = [
The unpredictable cost component evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion which is common knowledge:
where dZ t are identically and independently distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt, and both the drift parameter and the volatility parameter are constant. 10 Also C is a publicly observed information. 7 It is assumed that the buyer cannot write state-contingent contracts. This may be due to transaction costs or the inability to observe the realized value of project cost (Spulber, 1990) or, in the case of public works, to regulations forcing civil servants to use …xed-price contracts when awarding "simple" projects. 8 The costs for late completion may vary depending on the buyer and the nature of the project. For example, in public works, such as the rehabilitation of existing transport facilities, the cost of delays will include direct costs, such as those related to providing alternative temporary facilities, as well as indirect (social) costs, such as those related to increased tra¢ c congestion or losses for the business community (Herbsman et al., 1995; Arditi et al. 1997). 9 The assumption that the task can be instantly accomplished can be relaxed without a¤ecting the qualitative results of our model. For example, suppose that it takes "time-to-build" the project but there is a maximum rate k at which the contractor can invest in every period. Therefore, if the total expenditure is K, it takes T = K=k periods to complete the project. Assuming that the expenditures are made continuously over T , their present value is:
Since e rK t =k ' 1 r K k + :::; we getK ' K and the analysis can proceed pretty much as in the text. 1 0 Assuming that the state variable follows a lognormal random walk is standard in real-option models. However, alternative processes, such as mean-reverting, can be used. This would complicate the analysis, without changing the results signi…cantly.
Assumption 4 is independent of fC t ; t 0g and is exponentially distributed on R + ; i.e. F ( ) = 1 e , with density f ( ) = e for some > 0:
Assuming that bidders have symmetric rational expectations about the cost component C t and asymmetric private information on allows us to set the auction format into the independent private value framework. 11 Moreover, the exponential distribution is an useful simpli…cation in order to study the case where the buyer cannot enforce a timely performance. By assuming that bidders'information rents and the cost savings derived by not complying with the contract time are independent on , we rule out situations where, even though allocatively e¢ cient, the award process fails to assign the task to the agent who supplies …rst.
Finally, we exclude ex-post renegotiation as well as the introduction by the buyer of a maximum bid.
3 Enforceable versus unenforceable contract time
Enforceable contract time
As a useful benchmark, let us …rst suppose that the buyer is able to induce a timely performance. Implicitly, we allow su¢ ciently large penalties to be (costlessly) enforced, so that the seller will always …nd it convenient to comply with the contract time.
Thus, given that bidder i is selected, the ex-post value of the contract is:
where p i is the bid. Each agent will then choose the bid so as to maximize
where Pr p i < max j6 =i p j is the probability of reporting the lowest bid. The symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this bidding game is well known (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Krishna, 2002) , and is characterized by a strictly increasing bid function p( ), such that, if all bidders other than i bid p j = p( j ), then agent i bids p i = p( i ). The optimal equilibrium strategy is recorded in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 When the contract time is enforceable, the unique equilibrium in symmetric strictly monotone increasing strategies is characterized by:
(i) the bid function:
(ii) the expected payo¤ :
with enf ( u ! 1) = 0.
1 1 Note that none of the major results depend on this assumption. More generally, what is required is that conditionally on , the cost K has a continuous density g(K= ) on R+; that satis…es the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, or equivalently that g(K= ) is log-supermodular, i.e.
As and C are independent; g(K= ) = R R + n(K )d ; where n(:) is the density of C; then the log-supermodularity is trivially satis…ed as C has a log-normal distribution.
Proof. See Appendix A Given that agent i wins with bid p enf ( i ), the buyer will earn the value she places on performance less the price:
Unenforceable contract time
Now consider the opposite situation where the buyer cannot a¤ect the probability of performance. Implicitly, we assume that the contract does not provide for any (enforceable) compensation for late completion. Thus, barring reputation e¤ects from nonperformance, bidders compete for acquiring a project that includes an option-like component. Speci…cally, since the actual costs are determined by (2) , the ability to optimize plans, by choosing the delivery date, is analogous to acquiring a Put Option.
Assuming, for the sake of analytical tractability, that the winning bidder acquires a perpetual option, the ex post value of the contract is given by: 12
where (p i i C i ) is the N P V resulting from performing the task at the trigger C i , i is the random delivery date, and r is the discount rate.
To make the problem interesting, we introduce an additional assumption, which expresses that unpredictable costs are not negligible compared to the cost component , so that agents prefer to choose the delivery date in order to acquire more information about the actual production cost.
Assumption 5
Bidders have an option value of waiting before performing the task, i.e:
Our analysis proceeds by backward induction. First, we analyse the optimal exercise rule of a bidder that is awarded the contract. Next, we consider how agents will bid in the auction.
By Assumption 5, (8) can be rewritten as follows: 13
1 2 This assumption, which allows us to …nd closed-form solutions, implies that the contractor is allowed to keep the right to perform the assigned task forever. Admittedly this is quite unrealistic, since owners are generally entitled to terminate the contract when delays become "unacceptably large". However, none of the qualititative results presented in this section are substantially a¤ected by this assumption. 1 3 The solution to E0(e r ) can be obtained by using dynamic programming (see, for example, Dixit et al., 1999). Since (2) is continuous, the expected discount factor is increasing in C and decreasing in C ; then it can be de…ned by a function (C; C ). Over the in…nitesimal time interval dt, C will change by the small value dC; hence we get the following Bellman equation: r (C; C )dt = E(d (C; C )): By applying Itô's Lemma to d we obtain the following di¤erential equation:
which can be solved by imposing the two boundary conditions: limC!0 (C; C ) = 0 and limC!C (C; C )) = 1:
The general solution is (C; C )) =
; where < 0 is the negative root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
where:
Therefore, for any p i , the contractor will comply with the contract time if and only if V i 6 N P V i . Otherwise, she will be better o¤ by maximizing (9) with respect to C i and determining the optimal stopping time:
Following the real-option approach, the optimal exercise rule is that the project's bene…ts must outweigh its cost, where the latter consists of the strike price K i i plus the value of the option exercised by undertaking the project. Thus, by (9) , the optimal trigger is:
Plugging (10) into (9) yields
where (C)
Hence, each agent will look for the optimal bidding strategy p i that maximizes:
The solution for this bidding game is recorded in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If there are no damages for breach of contract, the unique equilibrium in symmetric strictly monotone increasing strategies is characterized by: (i) the bid function:
with put ( u ! 1) = 0 (iii) the optimal trigger:
Proof. See Appendix B Note that (13) can be written as
The innovation with respect to (5) is that the bidders'markups re ‡ect the cost savings derived by not complying with the contract time.
Thus, when the contract time is unenforceable, each bidder will maximize the probability of winning the project by identifying two prices contingent to the completion date, and reporting the lowest one:
, where p enf ( i ) stands for the price (5) which maximizes N P V i , and p put ( i ) stands for the price (13) which maximizes the Put Option V i . The optimal equilibrium strategy is recorded in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
If there are no damages for breach of contract, the optimal equilibrium strategy is characterised by:
Proof. See Appendix C The result summarized in Proposition 3 shows that, when bidders have an option value of waiting (i.e., C i < C), the buyer's inability to enforce compliance with the contract time will stimulate agents to bid more aggressively.
The intuition is that the possibility of saving on costs, by choosing the delivery date, allows weak agents to lower their bids, thereby forcing the most quali…ed bidders to exploit the time ‡exibility to preserve their chances of winning. The whole competitive process will then drive down the price, by so doing making all bidders potential violators of the contractual agreement. Therefore, given that agent i wins with bid p nf ( i ), the corresponding expected payo¤ for the buyer is:
where E 0 (e r i ) takes into account that the winning bid will be paid on the delivery date, and
represents the expected harm for late completion, with the information available at the time of contract award.
Comparison
Each party's expected payo¤ is clearly a¤ected by the unenforceability of the contract time. By Proposition 3 and direct inspection of (6) and (14) , it is apparent that the seller's expected payo¤ cannot take on a higher value when the contract time is unenforceable than when it is enforceable (see Appendix C):
The reason is that, when the contract time is unenforceable, the potential savings stemming from the possibility of optimally choosing the delivery date are outweighed by the stronger price competition spurred by the option-like nature of the bidded contract.
In the auction literature, a similar result may be found in DeMarzo et al. (2005), who compare the expected payo¤s of bidders in auctions where the value of the auctioned asset is not contingent on future events (in our framework, this occurs when the contract time is forceable), with those where the bids are securities whose values are derived from the future cash ‡ows. They show that all security-bid auctions yield lower bidders' payo¤s than a cash auction, and call options yield the lowest possible payo¤ of any security-bid auction. 14 For the buyer, by (7) and (16), we get:
Since, by Proposition 3, the …rst term on the r.h.s. is positive, the sign of W nf W enf will depend on the relative magnitude of the cost of delays to the owner. If the expected costs from late delivery come to exceed the expected bene…ts resulting from price reductions and late payments, the buyer prefers the contract time to be enforceable. The opposite occurs when the expected …nancial savings outweight the harm that the buyer could expect to su¤er from breach. The outcome of the bidding process is also a¤ected by the number of bidders. As shown by (15), the optimal trigger declines as n increases, i.e. project delays are more likely to occur if there are many competing agents, which is consistent with previous studies pointing out that, while squeezing agents' rents, open competition can entail a strong quality distortion (see, for example, Manelli and Vincent, 1995; Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009). Therefore, when the buyer is unable to induce compliance with the contract time, a strong competition should be favoured only if the harm the buyer expected from late completion is comparatively low with respect to the expected bene…ts arising from bid reductions.
As for the e¤ect of cost uncertainty, since j @ @ j> 0, taking the derivative of (14) with respect to , we …nd that:
i.e., the higher is the volatility parameter, the lower the seller's expected payo¤ in the absence of contract enforcement. For the buyer, as in the case of n, the impact of cost uncertainty is not univocal, insofar an increase in entails both a price reduction and an increased probability of time overruns (see Figure 1) :
Thus, once again, the positive impact of a price reduction must be assessed against the importance attached to on-time completion. Coeteris paribus, when the latter is very important for the buyer, the higher is , the higher is the potential loss arising from the inability to stimulate compliance with the contract time.
Liquidated damages
The preceding analysis shows that, when unpredictable production costs are non-negligible, the seller's expected payo¤ is strictly lower when the contract time is unenforceable than when is forceable.
The same applies to the buyer if the expected costs from late-delivery outweigh the potential bene…ts arising from price reductions and late payments, in which case the buyer would wish for damages for breach to be set su¢ ciently high that the contract time would always be obeyed. 15 Courts, however, may refuse to enforce compensation if the amount established at the time of contract award appears that it is was intended to pressurize the contractor into performance.
In particular, as already noted, in Common Law jurisdictions it is generally agreed that, to be enforceable, a liquidation of damages must be a reasonable estimate, with the information available at the time of contract award, of the harm a party could expect to su¤er from breach. If, regardless of what the actual loss turns out to be, the stipulated amount of compensation exceeds the probable loss, it is a penalty. 16 The scope of this section is to analyze the e¤ects of introducing a liquidated damages clause upon the parties'expected payo¤s.
We will do it by assuming that, to avoid litigation, the contract provides that, if a breach will occur ( > 0), the owner will be entitled to charge L( ) for late completion, with L 0 ( ) > 0.
Thus, if the pre-agreed amount of compensatory payment is enforceable, the ith agent's ex post value of the project becomes:
Since liquidated damages are commonly calculated on a cost per unit of time basis (e.g. per day basis) and are generally deducted in one lump-sum when making payment for the delayed delivery, to re ‡ect real-world practices we shall set: 17
where E 0 ( i ) is the expected time overrun, and h is taken to represent a widely recognized reasonable estimate of the average unit time cost, such that:
which rules out the risk that liquidated damages could be challenged as a penalty. 1 5 We have assumed that the buyer is forced to use …xed-price contracts, which, barring reputation e¤ects from nonperformance, "creates a role for legal remedies for breach of contract" (Spulber, 1990 , p.328). However, if the buyer were able to write state-contingent contracts, compliance with the contract time could be sustained by designing an appropriate cost-reimbursement scheme. For instance, suppose that the buyer is able to observe the realized value of costs and can make a binding committment to pay on delivery P = p + C , where p is the winning bid. By simply substituting P into(9), we get that the agent maximizes V i t by choosing C i = Ct: 1 6 While the common law does not enforce predetermined damages that were unreasonably large at the time of contract award, damages that were reasonable ex ante, but exceed the actual loss, may or may not be enforced depending on the jurisdiction (see Rea, 1984) . For example, in the United States, federal courts have enforced liquidated damages, inserted in public contracts, regardless of the actual damages (see, for example, Southern Engineering Co. v. United States 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965)). In some states, however, courts have adopted a di¤erent approach, by not enforcing damage clauses when the actual loss appeared to be lower than the predetermined damages (see, for example, Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock and Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 221 A.2d 263 (1966)). 1 7 Since, for increasing delays, e r i and i covariate to zero, without loss of generality we can write: E0(e
To cap the level of compensation, we approximate the expected amount of liquidated damages by expanding E 0 ( i ) by Taylor's theorem around the initial value C: 18 19 
where H = ( 1 2 2 ) 1 h indicates the maximum potential compensation payable for breach. Substituting (22) into (19) yields:
i.e., introducing a liquidated damages clause makes the project-value a path-dependent option, since the payo¤ depends both on C and the trigger C i . Therefore, for any given C, the strategy for valuing V i (:) is to start from the exercise date, when the option value is known (equal to the payo¤), and working backwards till the time of contract award.
Thus, maximizing (23) gives the optimal exercise boundary under liquidated damages:
that separates an early exercise region where C C i (C), from an hold region where C > C i (C).
Plugging the optimal trigger (24) into (23) yields:
The solution for this bidding game is recorded in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 By Assumption 5, under liquidated damages the unique equilibrium in symmetric strictly monotone increasing strategies is characterized by: (i) The bid function:
(ii) The expected payo¤ : 1 8 Note that, for the sake of analytical tractability, we have assumed that the bidder that is awarded the contract is allowed to keep the right to perform the task forever (see Section 3.2). This, however, could bring us to the unrealistic case of a potentially explosive value of compensation for time overruns. Therefore, the approximation (22) allows us to maintain analytical tractability, while capping the amount of compensation for breach (i.e., when C i = 0). 1 9 E0( ) is the mean time that the process C takes to reach the trigger level C for the …rst time. If the trigger exists,
i.e. (see Cox and Miller, 1965,p.221-222) . Thus, by the Taylor's theorem:
with ld ( u ! 1) = 0, (iii) The optimal trigger:
Proof. See Appendix D The central …nding in Proposition 4 is property (i), which states that, by exploiting the time ‡exibility, bidders can add the maximum potential compensation payable for breach into the bid.
The intuition is the following. Since agents bid knowing that they can choose the delivery date, by compensating the owner for late completion, competition will force the weakest bidder to revise delivery plans to preserve the non-negative payo¤ condition when paying H. This allows the other bidders to increase the price by H, without altering the monotonicity property of p ld ( i ), and then to make more pro…ts, by getting the di¤erence H E 0 ( i )h.
Thus, by following the same reasoning as in Section 3.2, each bidder will maximize the probability of winning the project by reporting min p ld ( i ); p enf ( i ) , where p ld ( i ) stands for the price (27) , and p enf ( i ) stands for the price (5) which maximizes the project value when complying with the contract time (N P V i ).
The optimal equilibrium strategy is recorded in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Under liquidated damages, bidders will bid lower than when the buyer is able to induce full compliance with the contract time, and higher than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for breach:
Proof. Straightforward from Appendix C Proposition 5 rests on Assumption 5, which, by (29) , requires that C > H (n 1) = H + C i , in which case, by exploiting the time ‡exibility, bidders will report p ld ( i ) < p enf ( i ). However, if the liquidated damages clause happens to discourage project delays (C < H + C i ), bidders will report p enf ( i ) (see Figure 2 ). The foregoing discussion can thus be summarised by the following Proposition.
On the other hand, if C > H + C i , then:
Proof. Straightforward from Propositions 2 and 3. Comparisons (iv) and (v) are of particular interest for evaluating the potential e¤ects of a liquidated damages clause on the parties'terms of trading.
The former follows from direct inspection of (14) and (28), from which it is apparent that the seller's expected payo¤ is higher under the expectation damage measure than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery.
, which implies that, under compensatory payments, the buyer's expected payo¤ is simply given by: 
whereas the corresponding payo¤, when the contract does not provide for any compensation for latedelivery, is given by:
Since both terms on the r.h.s. are negative, we get property (v) which states that, when damage provisions prove insu¢ cient in stimulating full compliance with the contract time, the buyer's expected payo¤ will be lower under liquidated damages than when the contract does not provide for any compensation for delay. This is because, while shortening the expected time of delivery (see comparison (iii)), the bene…t the promisee will receive from protecting herself against the potential loss arising from late completion is outweighed by the increase in the equilibrium bid.
Final remarks
This paper rests on two empirical premises. First, time overruns are common in public works and are not con…ned to inherently complex tasks, as even relatively simple projects, with little uncertainty about what needs to be done, are not immune from late completion. And second, this occurs despite damage measures, setting in advance compensation for late-delivery, are routinely included in contract documents.
One explanation advanced in this paper is that sellers, who have been awarded with …xed-price contracts, can undergo unpredictable changes in input costs which may generate an option value of waiting. Therefore, the higher is the volatility of costs, the higher should be the "penalty" required to force the promisor to give up the potential bene…ts derived by adjusting delivery plans after contract award.
In reality, as suggested by empirical evidence, damage measures are often not su¢ ciently stringent to prevent sellers from exploiting such ‡exibility. This may be due to several factors, including enforcement costs, which could draw promisees away from going to courts, or regulatory provisions and legal rules which put constraints upon the enforceable amount of compensation for late-delivery.
Whatever the source is, the inability to force sellers to meet their contractual obligations determines their bidding behaviour. Conversely, bidding behaviour alters the incentive to meet the contract time. In particular, by placing more aggressive bids, all bidders may become potential violators of the contractual agreement. The more the bidders and/or the higher the expected cost volatility, the higher the probability of breach.
The main question addressed in this paper was how this would ultimately a¤ect the parties'expected payo¤s. Barring reputation e¤ects for nonperformance, we showed that, when the buyer cannot a¤ect the probability of performance through her choice of an appropriate damage measure, the welfare of both parties will be lower than when the contract time is enforceable, unless the bene…ts to the buyer, resulting from bid reduction, outweigh the expected costs from late-delivery. Thus, when on-time delivery is very important for the buyer, she may wish for damages for failure to be set su¢ ciently high that the contractual obligations would always be ful…lled.
This, however, may be impeded by legal rules which prevent the promisee from contracting for damage measures which would grant more than her lost expectation, in which case, unless the expectation damage measure happens to discourage time overruns, setting a liquidated damages clause would not lead to a Pareto superior outcome with respect to the no-damage-for-delay condition. While increasing the seller's expected payo¤, this clause would be detrimental for the buyer because she would have to over pay for protecting herself against the potential loss arising from late completion, and so would gain nothing by pursuing it.
Taken together, these results cast doubt on the e¢ ciency rationale of the common law penalty doctrine. As long as buyers are bound to award …xed-price contracts through competitive tendering and bidders face non-negligible unpredictable changes of production costs, both parties may wish for damages for late-delivery which provide an e¤ective incentive against delayed orders. 
A Proof of proposition 1
u ], the probability of winning when bidding p i against rivals who play the strategy is Pr(
Thus, we can then write the ith agent's expected payo¤ as:
from which we …nd that
C must be non-negative to guarantee a positive expected payo¤ (otherwise winning the auction would be unpro…table). Let's suppose that the …rm i submits a bid p enf (~ i ) when its true cost is i . Maximizing (31) with respect to~ i and imposing the truth-telling condition~ i = i yields the necessary condition:
and, then
Di¤erentiating (33) with respect to i con…rms the assumed monotonicity of the optimal strategy p enf ( i ):
and by continuity for i = u as well. Further, the monotonicity of N P V ( i ) and the fact that the …rst order condition (32) has a unique solution assure that (33) is a global maximum. Finally, substituting F ( i ) = 1 e i ; with > 0 and i 2 [0; 1); it is easy to show that:
and 
B Proof of proposition 2
Consider the ith agent's bidding decision, by assuming that all other bidders use a strictly monotone increasing bid function p put ( i ) :
. The agent's expected payo¤ from bidding p i is:
is the winning bidder's Put Option. Again, since Pr(
, we can write the ith agent's expected payo¤ as:
Let's now suppose that agent i submits a bid p put (~ i ) when the nature reveals her expected cost i . Maximizing (36) with respect to~ i and imposing the truth-telling condition~ i = i yields the necessary condition:
By (37), the maximization problem can be reduced to the following …rst-order linear di¤erential equation: dp put ( i )
where
The (38) is a …rst-order linear di¤erential equation with variable coe¢ cient and variable term. The general solution of (38) can be obtained from:
where A( i ) is a function to be determined. Di¤erentiating the above expression and substituting into ((38) we get:
Integrating, we obtain:
which yields
Substituting (40) in (39) we get the general solution of the ith agent's bid function, where A l is a constant that can be determined by setting an appropriate initial condition. Thus by (36) we get
But (36) also implies that
thus, from (41) we get:
Rearranging (39) and (41), we get the …nal expression reported in the proposition:
and for the ex-ante payo¤:
Finally, di¤erentiating (43) with respect to i con…rms the assumed monotonicity of the optimal strategy p put ( i ):
and by continuity for i = u as well. It remains to show that (44), provides the unique local maximum to (36). As usual, the uniqueness follow from (38) with the boundary condition (42). For the maximum, consider a …rm with private cost i that reports a bid p i = p put (~ i ) with~ i 6 = i . From (36) and (43), we can write:
Di¤erentiating (45) with respect to~ i yields:
and rearranging:
which goes to zero only if
The second derivative of (45) evaluated at i =~ i yields:
which guarantees that a strict local maximum exists. By continuity and the fact that the …rst order condition has unique solution we get a global maximum. Again, by substituting F ( i ) = 1 e i ;
with > 0 and i 2 [0; 1); we obtain: 
C Proof of proposition 3
De…ning (x; i ) (10), the ex-ante payo¤ nf ( i ) = put ( i ) can be written as:
Therefore, the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ when the contract time is unenforceable and when is enforceable is:
D Proof of proposition 4
The proof follows the one of Proposition 2. The agent i 's expected payo¤ with the liquidated damages is:
Maximizing (47) with respect to~ i and imposing the truth-telling condition~ i = i yields the necessary condition:
= dp ld ( i )
which can be reduced to the following …rst-order linear di¤erential equation:
where S(
: Comparing (49) with (38) suggests that, under liquidated damages, the bidder will rise the bid by H: Then applying the general solution (39) to (49) we obtain:
and for the expected payo¤:
Finally, since^ > we gets:
This concludes the proof.
